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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
    
 
No. 11-2789 
    
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ROGELIO GOMAR-TORRES, 
 
Appellant 
    
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Criminal No. 1:10-cr-00648-001) 
District Judge: Jerome B. Simandale 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 21, 2012 
_______________ 
 
Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY JR., and O’MALLEY*, Circuit Judges
 
. 
(Opinion filed: October 9, 2012) 
    
 
OPINION   
    
 
O’MALLEY, 
                                            
* Honorable Kathleen M. O’Malley, United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, sitting by designation. 
Circuit Judge 
 2 
Rogelio Gomar-Torres (“Gomar-Torres”) pled guilty to one count of possession 
with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 
841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A).  The District Court sentenced Gomar-Torres to 120 months of 
imprisonment, the mandatory minimum for that offense.  Gomar-Torres appeals his 
sentence, arguing that the District Court clearly erred by finding him ineligible for a 
safety valve reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2.  We perceive no 
error by the District Court and, accordingly, affirm Gomar-Torres’ sentence.1
I. BACKGROUND 
 
 Since we write solely for the parties, we recite only the facts necessary to our 
decision. 
On July 27, 2010, Gomar-Torres was pulled over while driving a vehicle in New 
Jersey.  He was accompanied by Roberto Gomez-Polida (“Gomez-Polida”), a Mexican 
citizen like himself.  When both informed the police officer that they were in the United 
States illegally, they were detained and the officer searched the vehicle, finding thirteen 
kilograms of cocaine and $305,902 in a hidden compartment.  Gomar-Torres admitted 
that he was going to deliver the money and drugs to another individual.  The vehicle was 
registered to Brian Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”), who also owns the house in which Gomar-
Torres and Gomez-Polida shared a room.  Police searched the room and found a rifle and 
150 rounds of ammunition. 
                                            
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 3742(a). 
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A Grand Jury sitting in the District of New Jersey charged Gomar-Torres with two 
counts: possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A); and possession of a firearm by a convicted 
felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  On March 4, 2011, Gomar-Torres pled 
guilty to the first count. 
The District Court sentenced Gomar-Torres on June 24, 2011.  At sentencing, the 
Government opposed Gomar-Torres’ request for a sentence below the mandatory 
minimum, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 (“the safety valve 
provisions”).  Under these provisions, a district court may depart from the statutory 
mandatory minimum for an offense when calculating a defendant’s sentence if, among 
other things, the defendant establishes that he or she has “truthfully provided to the 
Government all information and evidence [he or she] has concerning the offense or 
offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan.”  
18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5).  The Government argued that Gomar-Torres failed to do so 
because he withheld information regarding the drug conspiracy that led to his arrest. 
The Government presented testimony from the lead case agent on Gomar-Torres’ 
investigation, Special Agent Cristin Hendrickson of the Department of Homeland 
Security.  Homeland Security had been investigating Gomar-Torres for some time prior 
to his arrest and Special Agent Hendrickson was involved in the investigation from its 
onset.  She also participated in Gomar-Torres’ arrest and two of three proffer sessions 
which followed.  During sentencing, Special Agent Hendrickson testified that she 
believed Gomar-Torres withheld relevant information during these proffer sessions. 
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Special Agent Hendrickson stated that Gomar-Torres lied about a prior incident in 
which he delivered a suitcase to a mall in Elizabeth, New Jersey.  Gomar-Torres claimed 
that he was accompanied by Gonzalez on that trip, but Special Agent Hendrickson 
testified that she witnessed the delivery and a different person, not Gonzalez, was with 
Gomar-Torres.  Special Agent Herndrickson also stated that, after she confronted Gomar-
Torres with his phone records, he admitted to making a call on the night before his arrest.  
He stated in a proffer session that he called a man named Jose Chameco (“Chameco”), 
who Gomar-Torres claimed was in Mexico at the time of the call.  Special Agent 
Hendrickson testified that this claim was impossible, however, because Chameco was in 
New Jersey, not Mexico, on that night and, according to his phone records, Gomar-Torres 
called a Mexican cell phone number.  Special Agent Hendrickson said that, in her 
experience, she has never seen a Mexican phone work in the United States.  Special 
Agent Hendrickson believed, accordingly, that Gomar-Torres must have called someone 
other than Chameco on the night specified. 
Special Agent Hendrickson also felt that Gomar-Torres misrepresented Gonzalez’s 
involvement in the drug conspiracy.  Initially, Gomar-Torres denied that Gonzalez had 
participated in the scheme, but after Special Agent Hendrickson confronted him with 
information regarding Gonzalez’s involvement, he admitted that Gonzalez did take part. 
Based on this testimony, the District Court denied Gomar-Torres’ request for relief 
under the safety-valve provisions.  The District Court found that Gomar-Torres withheld 
relevant information.  The District Court discounted Gomar-Torres’ proffer because it 
found that he had otherwise lied throughout the investigation.  Specifically, the District 
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Court found that Gomar-Torres: (1) was untruthful about Gonzalez’s involvement in the 
drug conspiracy, stating that Gonzalez was not involved even though he was; (2) lied 
about his relationship with Gomez-Polida, stating that they did not live together although 
they did; (3) falsely claimed that he was accompanied by Gonzalez on a trip to deliver a 
suitcase to a person in Elizabeth, New Jersey, even though he was accompanied by 
someone else; and (4) lied about a call he made on the night before his arrest, falsely 
stating that he had called Chameco when he in fact called someone else. 
Accordingly, the District Court held that Gomar-Torres failed to demonstrate by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he satisfied the fifth prerequisite for application of the 
safety valve.  That is, Gomar-Torres did not show that he truthfully provided to the 
Government all information and evidence he had concerning the drug conspiracy in 
which he was involved. 
After denying relief under the safety valve, the District Court proceeded to 
sentence Gomar-Torres.  The District Court calculated a guideline range based on an 
offense level of twenty-nine and a criminal history category of I, making the range for 
Gomar-Torres 87 to 108 months of imprisonment.  The mandatory minimum, however, 
was 120 months.  Gomar-Torres did not object to the calculation.  The District Court 
recognized that there were no motions for departure other than Gomar-Torres’ motion 
under the safety valve, which the District Court had denied.  Finally, the District Court 
considered the relevant factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), stating that, because Gomar-
Torres had been untruthful and had been in possession of a firearm, the Court was 
tempted to depart upward even further than required by the applicable mandatory 
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minimum.  Ultimately, however, the District Court sentenced Gomar-Torres to the 
mandatory minimum of 120 months of imprisonment. 
Gomar-Torres appealed his sentence to this Court on June 28, 2011. 
II. DISCUSSION 
 We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s application of the safety 
valve.  See United States v. Wilson, 106 F.3d 1140, 1143 (3d Cir. 1997).  But we review 
the District Court’s underlying factual determinations, such as the finding that Gomar-
Torres withheld relevant information from the Government, for clear error.  See United 
States v. Sabir, 117 F.3d 750, 752 (3d Cir. 1997).  Credibility determinations, such as 
those made by the District Court regarding Gomar-Torres and Special Agent 
Hendrickson, are almost never clear error.  United States v. Igbonwa, 120 F.3d 437, 441 
(3d Cir. 1997)  (“[W]hen the district court’s [determination about the credibility of a 
witness] is based on testimony that is coherent and plausible, not internally inconsistent 
and not contradicted by external evidence, there can almost never be a finding of clear 
error.”). 
 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5) permits a district court to impose a sentence below a 
statutory mandatory minimum if it finds that the defendant satisfies five criteria, 
including that: 
not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the 
defendant has truthfully provided to the Government all 
information and evidence the defendant has concerning the 
offense or offenses that were part of the same course of 
conduct or of a common scheme or plan, but the fact that the 
defendant has no relevant or useful other information to 
provide or that the Government is already aware of the 
 7 
information shall not preclude a determination by the court 
that the defendant has complied with this requirement. 
 
The defendant bears the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a 
safety valve reduction applies.  See Sabir, 117 F.3d at 754. 
 The District Court found that Gomar-Torres withheld relevant information from 
the Government regarding the drug scheme in which he was involved and, thus, Gomar-
Torres failed to meet his burden of showing that he satisfied the fifth criteria for 
application of the safety valve.  That finding was not clearly erroneous.  It was amply 
supported by the record and was based in large part on credibility determinations both as 
to the statements of Gomar-Torres and the testimony of Special Agent Hendrickson.   
 Gomar-Torres claimed to the District Court that he gave the Government all 
relevant information within his knowledge and that all the information he provided was 
truthful.  But he offered no sworn testimony to support this assertion.  The District Court 
discredited Gomar-Torres’ claims because he had been untruthful throughout the case.  
As noted above, on several different occasions Gomar-Torres had changed his statements 
when confronted with information that proved him wrong.  The District Court had 
extensive support for its credibility determination regarding Gomar-Torres’ claims; we 
will not disturb them. 
 The District Court based most of its factual findings on the testimony of Special 
Agent Hendrickson, indicating that it found her testimony credible.  The District Court 
agreed with Special Agent Hendrickson that, despite Gomar-Torres’ statements to the 
contrary, Gomar-Torres was not accompanied by Gonzalez when he delivered a suitcase 
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to a mall in Elizabeth, New Jersey.  The District Court also found that, as Special Agent 
Hendrickson testified, Gomar-Torres called someone other than Chameco on the night 
before his arrest.  The District Court’s credibility determinations regarding Special Agent 
Hendrickson’s testimony are also not clearly erroneous.  They were based on her 
coherent and plausible testimony, which was subject to cross-examination, not internally 
inconsistent, and not contradicted by external evidence.  See Igbonwa, 120 F.3d at 441 
(3d Cir. 1997). 
 Gomar-Torres argues that Special Agent Hendrickson’s testimony is unverifiable 
because it is based on hearsay.  Appellant’s Amended Brief at 6.  We disagree.  The 
testimony on which the District Court relied was a first-hand account by Special Agent 
Hendrickson.  To the extent that some of her beliefs were based on information given to 
her by third parties, Gomar-Torres acknowledges that hearsay testimony may be 
considered in sentencing proceedings if it is reliable.   See United States v. Robinson, 482 
F.3d 244, 246 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he Confrontation Clause does not apply in the 
sentencing context and does not prevent the introduction of hearsay testimony at a 
sentencing hearing,” but “hearsay statements must have some minimal indicium of 
reliability beyond mere allegation.”) (internal quotations marks omitted).  The District 
Court committed no error on this point.  In fact, the District Court refused to rely on 
certain testimony by Special Agent Hendrickson that was based on information from 
sources which, because they were involved in an ongoing investigation, remained 
undisclosed.  J.A. at 112a (“I’m not considering other information because it wasn’t 
backed up by reliable basis.”). 
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 The District Court’s factual finding that Gomar-Torres failed to provide the 
Government all information he had related to the drug scheme in which he was involved 
was not clearly erroneous.  Accordingly, the Court correctly found that Gomar-Torres 
was ineligible for application of the safety valve and receipt of the benefits flowing 
therefrom. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Gomar-Torres’ sentence. 
